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NEGRITUDE AND BERGSONISM
Messay Kebede
Introduction
It is generally admitted that both the form and the content of Negritude
owe much to Western philosophical discourses, especially to French
intellectual influence. The fact that the two most outstanding exponents
of Negritude, namely Leopold S. Senghor and Airne Cesaire, are deeply
impregnated with French culture is taken as a case in point. And among
the French roots, some scholars single out the profound impact of Henri
Bergson. Thus, Abiola Irele maintains that "it is largely the epistemology
of Bergson that Senghor has adopted in his formulation of Negritude."l
Undeniable as the Western influence and, in particular, the Bergsonian
impact are, their extent, however, has not been properly defined through
concrete studies of conceptual and ideological connections. Yet seeing
how thoroughly Negritude "has impregnated not only poetry and the
novel in Africa but also African research in all the different human
sciences," a meticulous knowledge of affiliations is most necessary to
decide to what extent the self-appointed African philosophy is really
authentic, expressive of African indigenous thought.2 Besides admitting
Negritude's dependence on the philosophy of Bergson, this paper shows
its far-reaching impact by establishing conceptual, methodological, and
ideological filiations. However, it also raises the question of knowing
where Negritude departed from Bergsonism and to what extent this
bifurcation inaugurated a distinctly African discourse.
Bergsonian Epistemology and the Other Way of
Knowing
The best way to connect Negritude with Western philosophical positions is
via the debate opposing the defenders of reason and those who rebelled
against its dominance. As an influential trend of Western thinking, the
Cartesian philosophical project had promised to bring nature as well as
human desires, social environment, and aspirations under the governance
of reason. Elevating the Cartesian reductionist project to an even greater
level through the use of the dialectical method, G. W. F. Hegel forwarded
the bold proposal that "what is rational is actual and what is actual is
rational."3 But no sooner had Hegel celebrated the final triumph of
reason than a wave of irrationalism swept through Europewith the vogue
for romanticism. It evolved into diverse forms, but maintained the
leitmotif that everything is not reducible to the rational. As D. A. Masolo
puts it: "The pre-World War II Europeanphilosophical movements of neo-
Marxism, phenomenology, existentialism, and surrealism, with their
general revolt against the Hegelian transcendental objectivism and
'system' turned toward a type of irrationalism emphasizing the
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European philosophical movements of neo-Marxism, phenomenology,
existentialism, and surreaHsm, with thelr general revolt against the
Hegelian transcendental objectivism and 'system' turned toward a type
of irrationalism emphasizing the spontaneity of man's bare existence as
constituting the search for meanings or essences.vj Since Negritude
briskly distinguished itself by a philosophical position claiming non-
rationality, one cannot help relating its rise with the misfortunes that
have struck the idea of reason in the West.
Yet a question springs to mind: Was this European background of a
receding authority of reason enough to inspire Negritude's radical
profession of non-rationality? Clearly, to hail Blackness in the manner of
Senghor and Cesaire, especially, to so proudly claim non-technicalness,
something more than the relativization of reason was required. But posit
a philosophical ambiance such that what historicism termed backward,
primitive is diagnosed as what the West lost as a result of a one-sided
advancement. So conceived, the Western path appears as a unilateral
move associating progress in some aspects of life with regress in other
areas of life.S Because Bergson created this philosophical atmosphere,
in many ways, Negritude appears as unthinkable without him.
Let me begin by placing Bergson's contributions in the context of the
French culture which, as a compensation for the excessive rationalism of
Cartesianism, produced an impressive array of protests against the
dominance of reason. From the French romantic movement, diversely
highlighted by such writers as Jean Jacques Rousseau, Victor Hugo,
Charles Baudelaire, Arthur Rimbaud, to the apex of surrealism, the
project to debunk reason has always merged with the consideration that
the European model of life may be a truncated type of life, that in
particular, non-Western societies are perhaps opening "larger horizons
beyond Western civilization,"Q Thus, Rousseau's bias toward the
simplicity and destitution of the noble savage following a diagnosis of
European mode of life that particularly deplores the extent to which, as
he himself puts it, "our souls have become corrupted in proportion as
our sciences and our arts have advanced toward perfection," can be
taken as a characteristic example of a revaluation of the notion of
primitive peoples.Z
Incidentally, the recognition of the importance of the connection
between French culture in general and Negritude can be used to settle
the issue pertaining to the alleged difference between French and British
colonial methods. Here and there, views are expressed according to
which Negritude was born on the French soil because of the French
assimilationist policy, as opposed to the British system of indirect rule.
The forced assimilation, it is argued, brought about a reaction of
"passionate exaltation of the black race" in lieu of the restraint that
prevailed in the British colonies of Afrlca.B A distinction of this nature
between the two colonial powers is hopelessly futile; in both cases we
find the same policy of "reduction and acculturation."2 If at all it means
something, it must be that the French outcry against the supremacy of
reason was more conducive to an exalted assertion of Blackness than
the subdued atmosphere of British empiricism.
For that matter, Bergson represents the philosophical culmination of the
French protest against the rule of reason. But this characterization falls
short of indicating the specific contributions of Bergson unless it brings
out the sharp and resounding concepts by which Bergson articulated and
redefined the spiritual ambiance. The appropriation of these special
conceptual tools as well as arguments was crucial for Negritude's
crusade against historicism and Eurocentrism. What is said here is no
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mere speculation, since Senghor himself has overtly hailed the
appearance of Bergson's Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate
Data of Consciousness10 as "the revolution of 1889. "11 It was a
revolution because it had a profoundly upsetting effect on art, literature,
and science through the suggestion that "facts and matter, which are
the objects of discursive reason, were only the outer surface that had to
be transcended by intuition in order to achieve a vision in-depth of
reality. "12
Bergson's valorization of intuition through the discrediting of reason is
somewhat banal, perhaps also misleading: all romantic movements have
come up with the same idea. There is revolution only if something
previously unsaid is said, if a new vision is attained. Bergson gave an
idea of his new conception when, summarizing his idea that life does not
proceed by the association and addition of characters and functions, but
by dissociation and division, he wrote: "The cardinal error which, from
Aristotle onwards, has vitiated most of the philosophies of nature, is to
see in vegetative, instinctive and rational life, three successive degrees
of the development of one and the same tendency, whereas they are
three divergent directions of an activity that has split up as it grew."13
The resolute direction of a thought going against the basic assumptions
of evolutionism and historicism is palpable in the statement. Equally
tangible is the opportunity offered to non-Western thinkers to desert the
successive and unilinear conception of evolution for a divergent process
resulting in different civilizations. But before going further, one
important point must be settled. Bergson is known to have influenced
Negritude through his theory of intuition and his criticism of
intellectualism. To bring, as I do, the problem of evolution can appear at
best as a side issue, at worst as a deviation. Some such objection
would, however, totally ignore to what extent Bergson's epistemology is
rooted in his theory of the evolution of life.
The opposition between intelligence or discursive reason and intuition
presupposes the divergent movement of life. This is so true that what
Bergson calls intuition is none other than "the fringe of instinct" that
"still hangs round the edge of intelligence" following the separation
between intelligence and instinct.1A Because of its exclusive
confinement to the immediate interests of the forms of life resulting
from the divergent process of life, the original consciousness of intuition
assumed a somnambulistic form by becoming instinct. Not so
intelligence: more prone to manipulate the externality of things, it
developed into an active consciousness while remaining Mndicapped by
the loss of the inner, intuitive knowledge of reality. All the same, the
divergent movement cannot cancel the original unity of instinct and
intelligence so that "just as there subsisted around animal instinct a
fringe of intelligence, so human intelligence preserved a halo of
intuition. "15 The specific contribution of Bergson, over and above the
romantic protest against European intellectualism, does transpire in this
anchorage of epistemology in a theory of evolution. The result is that
discursive reason, masterful in manipulating externality, is at a loss
when it turns its attention to the underlying reality. The divergent
movement of life explains the inability of intelligence: during the
evolutionary journey, intelligence abandoned the complementary
function of instinctive apprehension.
Two things are here of interest to African scholars: (1) far from being
the summit of human existence, the excessive import of reason in
Western civilization reveals a skimpy, one-Sided, and for that matter,
frenzied form of life; (2) other human civilizations could well be
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attempts to preserve and activate what intelligence has abandoned, to
wit, the instinctive knowledge of being. That such is Senghor's
conclusion is best illustrated by his comparison of the European with the
African. The European keeps the object at a distance, and hence
immobilizes and fixes it; the Negro is quite different: "he does not see
the object; he feels it. "16 These two different attitudes to the world
yield distinct types of knowledge. Whereas the need to assimilate,
dominate, manipulate the object animates the European, "what affects
the African Negro is not so much the appearance of an object as its
profound reality, its "surreelite'; not so much its form as its
meaning.IfI1Z This is an exact reproduction of a Bergsonian formula:
"Intelligence, in so far as it is innate, is the knowledge of a form;
instinct implies the knowledge of a matter. "18
Insofar as the substitution of the concept of divergent movement for the
notion of unilinear evolution clears the way for an epistemological
pluralism leading to different types of knowledge, Bergson has indeed
handed over to Negritude the vision and conceptual tools liable to
articulate and substantiate the idea of different civilizations or cultural
orientations. Those societies, it follows, which did not comply with the
European model could not be said to be backward or primitive, but
rather on divergent lines of evolution. Instead of being unilinear
evolution having burst into various directions, the very terms of
superiority and inferiority, of advanced and primitive societies, make no
sense. All societies are imperfect because they all follow specific courses
that particularize them; none is a model. Still less can a given society be
backward, since what it achieves is one aspect of humanity, not its
inferior stage. Evolution is not the unfolding of humanity according to a
stage-producing-stage process resulting in inferior and superior social
formations, but the creation of diverse personalities through the
emphasis on particular traits drawn from a common stock of virtualities.
Reproducing almost the very words of Bergson, Senghor writes: "nature
has arranged things well in willing that each people, each race, each
continent, should cultivate with special affection certain of the virtues of
man; that is precisely where originality lies."19 As a result, Africa
became the seat of a civilization based on intuition, the very intuition
that Europe deserted in favor of a civilization urging for material
conquest. The great merit of Bergson, in Senghor's eyes, is to have
combined the critique of discursive reason with a choice of civilization
intent on emphasizing some aspects of life at the expense of others,
thus replacing the evolutionary hierarchy by the idea of pluralism.
From the viewpoint of Negritude, no better illustration of the distinction
between intuition and intelligence can be found than in Bergson's
refutation of Lucien Levy-Bruhl's notion of primitive mentality. The
refutation is a complex one, but the basic argument revolves around the
untenability of the idea of prelogicality. After having shown that
primitive peoples rely, as civilized peoples do, on the invariability of
natural laws in the ordinary course of their life and, inversely, that
civilized peoples too give in to mystical beliefs occasionally, Bergson
concluded that "there is nothing illogical, consequently nothing
'prelogical'" about the thinking of primitives.20 Instead of rushing into
evolutionary inferences, Bergson advised analysts of primitive mentality
to ponder when the civilized person appeals to mystical forces. They will
find that the resemblance between the thinking of the civilized and the
mentality of the primitive becomes striking "when dealing with facts
such as those ... [of] death, illness, serious accident."21 Put otherwise,
human beings, be they primitive or civilized, revert to supernatural
explanations when they face vital events directly affecting them as
http://www.fricanphilosophy.com/issue3/kebede.html
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persons. If primitive peoples seem overflowed with mystical beliefs, the
explanation lies in the little control they have over their environment.
Owing to this major limitation, supernatural references are indeed more
frequent and more extensive than is the case with the civilized. This
demonstrates that mystical explanations appear whenever human
thinking pays attention to the "human significance" of phenomena over
and above their mere physical nature.22
In The Foundations of "Africanit(Y or "Negritude" and "Arabite", Senghor
reiterated these premises of Bergsonian epistemology. He gave a long
quotation from The Two Sources of Morality and Religion in which magic
is depicted as an endowment of things with "human fluid".23 This
involvement of the human translates the evolutionary distinction
between pre-logical and logical stages into two different approaches to
reality, the intuitive and the intellectual, the former being interested, to
use Senghorian expressions, in the "meaning" of the object and the
latter in its "form."24 Levv-Bruhl called pre-logical stage this attention
to meaning, the very one which drew from Cesaire this cry of a strange
pride:
my negritude is neither tower nor cathedral
it plunges into the red flesh of the soil
it plunges into the blazing flesh of the sky25
In thus transposing l.evv-Bruhl's discrimination between prelogicality
and logicality into distinct forms of knowledge rather than into
hierarchical moments of the same process, Bergson provided Negritude
with all the premises legitimizing its conceptions of dissimilar races that
culminate in the opposition between European civilization and the
African Negro civilization.
Let us insist on the difference in value orientation issuing from the
epistemological disparity. The human intellectual orientation, Bergson
maintained, implies the drive to conquer matter. However, unlike
intuition, which goes in the direction of life, the conquest of matter has
required that consciousness should "determine itself more especially as
intellect. ".2QNonetheless, intuition is never completely erased; however
vague and discontinuous, it coexists with intelligence. Above all, "it
glimmers whenever a vital interest is at stake."27 In opposition to the
intellect, its method of approach is not conquest and manipulation, but
"sympathy. "28 Rational knowledge separates, dissociates, and fixes the
object; sympathetic or intuitive knowledge associates, incorporates, and
so provides a unified, integrated vision of reality. Sympathy grasps
meaning rather than mechanism because it feels the vital link running
through all phenomena and conceives them in their unity and solidarity,
transcending all forms of dualism. This power to unify, merge, establish
kinship, which is then truly sympathy as opposed to the dislocating,
dismembering work of intelligence, brings out the great metaphysical
aptitude of intuition.
There remains the application of these dissimilar characters of intuition
and intelligence to peoples of different races. Using almost the same
words, Senghor converted into the distinguishing features of the
European what Bergson attributed to intelligence, while the characters
of intuition pass to the African. Unlike the European white who fixes the
object and "dissects it with a ruthless analysis," the African Negro feels
the object; 29 he/she is emotion, "going centrifugally from subject to
object on the waves of the Other. "30 Had it not been for imposing facts
coming to its rescue, this Senghorian transposition would have appeared
as totally arbitrary and artificial. But facts show the material retardation
http://www.fricanphilosophy.com/issue3 /kebede .html
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of Africa, still more the European colonial conquest of Africa. These two
major facts are not intelligible, especially to Africans, unless they are
placed in the context of divergent epistemological and axiological
orientations. In short, the distinction between intelligence and intuition
has crystallized in human history into the appearance of divergent
mental and cultural trends situated respectively in Africa and Europe.
The distinct mental orientation defines the European as a "man of
determination, a warrior, a bird of prey/'3J while the African tendency
emphasizes sensitivity, the fact of living "in symbiosis" with the world ..32
Cesaire has poignantly expressed the difference as being the very one
existing between the conquerors of matter and those who give
themselves up to the essence of all things ignorant of surfaces but
struck by the movement of all things free of the desire to tame but
familiar with the play of the world33.
In this way, the deep reason for the African material lag is to be found
in the spiritual orientation of Africa rather than in the circumstantial
causes enumerated by scholars, such as geographical handicaps,
slavery, colonialism, etc.
To the extent that this analysis suggests that Senghor and Cesaire
spoke with the same voice, it can provoke the objection according to
which, much more than Senghor, Cesaire blamed colonialism for the
failure of modernization in colonized societies. Granted that Cesaire's
more revolutionary and anti-Western stand, as opposed to Senghor's
more conservative and conciliatory attitude towards the West, is
undeniable, the disparity, however, does not erase the fact that both
basically agree in their understanding of African originality. The political
divergence means, not the lack of a common philosophical inspiration,
but as often happens in the history of ideas, the split of the Negritude
movement into different trends. The split shows the wealth of the
movement, but also divergent analyses of the Western challenge. While
Senghor and Cesaire both blamed colonialism and imperialism, Cesaire
developed the need for a rebellious attitude as an appropriate response
to the brutality and deep damages of colonial rule. Increasingly
exhibiting Marxist leanings, he ruled out Europe's ability to solve "the
two major problems to which its existence has given rise: the problem
of the proletariat and the colonial problem."34 For his part, Senghor
hoped for a progressive course through the integration of African,
Western, and other cultures the end product of which will be the rise of
the universal, which transcends races and works toward the narrowing
of economic disparities. "This triple dialogue, between ourselves and the
others, can have only one aim, to assure peace and build the Civilization
of the Universal,"35 he writes.
The Multifaceted Nature of Bergsonian Influence
The fact that Bergson's theory of knowledge is inseparable from his
metaphysical views suggests that his decisive influence on Negritude
extends beyond epistemological questions. It presupposes metaphysical
affinities so that a true picture of the dependence of Negritude on
Bergsonian philosophy must take into account ontological borrowings.
And as metaphysical affinities have repercussions on all aspects of life,
the ramifications of Bergsonian influence are bound to reach ethical and
social ideas.
Take the idea of vital force, considered by many scholars as the
embodiment of Africa's specific comprehension of being. According to
http://www.icanphilosophy.com/issue3 /kebede .html
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5enghor, the characteristic feature of African ontology is that "the Negro
identifies being with life: more precisely, with vital force."39 So close is
this idea of vital force to Bergson's central notion of vital impetus that
Masolo speaks of "its filiation in the philosophy of Henri Bergson."37 To
be more specific, the closeness springs to mind when 5enghor argued
that, for the African, life is "a force, living matter, capable of re(in)-
forcing his energy or de-bilitating it."38 For Bergson too, life cannot be
resolved into physical and chemical facts; it is "an inward impulse that
passes from germ to germ through individuals" so that what living
individuals are capable of doing is an outcome of the impulse or force
they have received39
Granted that Bergson's idea of vital impulse is a complex concept
referring to a no less complex philosophical and scientific debates
concerning the origin and evolution of life, it is nevertheless interesting
to note that his vitalism is directed against Western idealism and
materialism, since "it claims to transcend both mechanism and
finalism. "40 As a dissident conception, it became entitled to be used,
first by Placide Tempels, then by the exponents of Negritude, to express
the philosophical views of Africans. Moreover, Bergson's grand manner
of articulating and elevating the notion of vital impetus to the level of a
theory matching the most elaborate philosophical and scientific theories
of life has freed vitalism from the stigma of being a primitive, pre-
scientific conception. 5enghor must have had this Bergsonian backing in
mind when he made the point of saying that the idea of vital force "does
not contradict the present scientific ideas."41
Because the notion of vital force is refractory to Western intellectual
canons, Bergson insisted that it is obtained more by intuition than by
discursive reason. Negritude saw in this restriction the possibility of an
extensive use of the notion both to affirm the African difference and to
propose a well-matched version of life. The issue of the vision of life is
all the more important, since it is concerned with the question of
meaning, beyond the conquest of matter. Those who did not invent
anything can claim to be familiar with the world only if it is proven that
mastery over things does not necessarily entail an insight into reality.
The main condition for the insight may be the displacement of the
dominating impulse by a disposition to play with the world. The notion of
vital force is the one that the mind forges as soon as, refusing to
dominate, it becomes a participant ready to play with the world.
Whereas for the dominator the world appears as an ensemble of fixed
and divided, that is, objectified phenomena, for the player it is an
ensemble of interpenetrating forces which can reinforce or debilitate
his/her energy, to use 5enghor's revealing terms. The player does not
stand out from the world, as a tower or a cathedral, but plunges into the
network of interpenetrating forces and gives way to the resulting
current.
If the urge to dominate leads away from the truth, then how much more
so may it divert from the good? According to Bergson, "there is
something frenzied" about Western civilization, due to its one-sided
pursuit of wealth and powerA2 In opting for mechanism to the
detriment of mysticism, it has suppressed the complementary tendency
able to mitigate the frenzy of wealth and power. It is now in a deadlock:
no sooner are old needs satisfied than "new needs arise, just as
imperious and increasingly numerous."43 It is an endless race whose
consequence is the exasperation of the pursuit of pleasure and
consumption, not its satisfaction. It inflates the mechanical force, less so
the ascetic power of humanity, unfortunately with the consequence that
increasingly destructive weapons are put at the disposal of a tendency
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already too inclined to war and luxury.
As a substitute for the vain and dangerous search for more power,
Bergson recommended "the return to a simpler life."44 Not only does
this mean putting a curb on the pursuit of wealth and power, but also
using the material power thus far accumulated by humanity to expand
its intuitive, mystical power, for instance through psychical researches.
In the words of Bergson, "the body, now larger, calls for a bigger soul,
and that mechanism should mean mysticism."<t,5 The increase of the
mystical power of humanity upgrades its ascetic will; better, it opens up
access to joy by eclipsing the frenzy of pleasure.
Nothing could be more appealing to the thinkers of Negritude than this
recommendation to expand mysticism to remedy the defects of Western
civilization. In addition to rehabilitating the African way of life by
displaying the inner wisdom of simple life, the advice redirects the
civilizing mission. Everything appears as though Africa-the siege of
"mystic civilization" according to Senghor-was summoned to the rescue
of a West overwhelmed by the products of its meqalomanla.qe Cesaire
can demand "pity for our conquerors, ail-knowing and naIve!"1:Z Indeed,
to see the whole Western uproar winding up in the deadlock of a
mechanized and hazardous civilization would have been comical, had it
not been for the high stakes involved. Pity is, therefore, the appropriate
feeling, soon followed by the resolution to save what deserves to be
saved, but this time the saviors coming from all the corners of the
world. For no race holds a monopoly of beauty, intelligence and strength
there is room for all at the meeting-place of conquest48
Senghor agreed: the African eligibility to find a place in the chorus of
civilizations passes through Negritude, squarely defined as the "defense
and development of African cultural values."49 Clearly, this vision of
Africa as having a place, as being an autonomous personality leans on
the Bergsonian reevaluation of some of African realities considered so
far as backward, such as simplicity of life and technological lag.
But this is not all that there is to be said. In suggesting that the West, to
come to its senses, needs some of the characteristics relegated to a
primitive age, Bergson lends himself to an interpretation that projects
the African legacy from prehistory into the future. Senghor has fully
utilized this Bergsonian lift to articulate what he called the "civilization of
the universal." Arguing that all great civilization "resulted from an
interbreeding,"SO_ the twentieth century, he maintained, would not be
universal "unless it is seasoned with the salt of negritude. For it would
be without the savour of humanity."Sl True, when Senghor portrayed
the specific content of Negro civilization, he drew more from Marx and
other socialist thinkers than Bergson, the reason being that Bergson had
nowhere hailed communalism as an advanced social organization. By
contrast, Marx's views on collectivism authorize the characterization of
the "collectivist and communal" nature of African civilization as
"socialist. ",52 In addition to describing and rehabilitating the past, the
concept of socialism opens up the future: the Marxist idea of placing
collectivism at the end of the history of class struggle transposes African
communalism from prehistory to the denouement of Western history.
Limited though the use of Bergsonian concepts for the glorification of
communalism may be, Senghor understood that the spirit of Bergson's
theory of vital force as well as his rehabilitation of intuition perfectly
agree with, even posit, a socialist pattern of life. How otherwise could
the conception of being that promotes the "reconciliation between the
inert and the living" celebrate integration and unification?,53 In
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opposition to the fixed and juxtaposed notion of being, the path to
ontological unity avoids confrontation, individualism, and domination. In
a word, Bergsonian ontology and epistemology define communalism as
an attitude consistent with the nature of life. Emotion would surely dry
up if confrontation and aggressiveness became the norm of life. The
mystic temperament of the Negro requires a mode of existence in which
solidarity supplants confrontation. The fact that the African Negro was
thus "enclosed in a narrow network of vertical and horizontal solidarity"
gives "the most precise illustration of [the] truth, upheld today by
Socialism, according to which Man lives and is realized only by and in
society. "54
On the other hand, Senghor did not forget the meaning of divergence in
Bergson's theory of life. To be sure, divergence is the source of
originality. Nonetheless, it is also true that it imparts a particular mode
of life that falls short of the full wealth of life. Notwithstanding its merits,
the African civilization is only one variety among other ways of life; as
such, it is incomplete and unilateral. This one-sidedness sets off the
historicity of Negritude, its quest for completion through interbreeding
with other modes of life, in particular with Western civilization because
of its technical achievements. "Our task," wrote Senghor, "is to
integrate, to assimilate the complementary values with our own to make
new blood."55
We are touching on a sensitive issue here. More often than not, Senghor
has been strongly condemned for views labeled sympathetic to the
West. Critics could not but deplore the dismaying divergence between
the original revolutionary stand of Negritude and the politics pursued by
Senghor, politics that many define as a "strategy of compromise with
the colonial master," as "a mask for a policy of accommodation to neo-
colonial situation."56 These same critics revel in the consistently
revolutionary position adopted by the other outstanding theoretician of
Negritude, namely, Cesaire.
My point is not to deny the discrepancy between the two most important
thinkers of Negritude, but to emphasize that the defense of otherness
calls for completion through interbreeding. In this regard, Cesaire is as
open as Senghor: for him too, the struggle of black peoples must help
"to found the universal humanism" by steering otherness toward
convergence. 57 The choice between fidelity and the West does not
appear to him as a sensible proposal, for "in the African culture yet to be
born," "there will be many new elements, modern elements, let us face
it, borrowed from Europe."2.~ To the Senghorian plea for "an
assimilation that leaves room for association,"59 there corresponds
Cesaire's vision of a "rejuvenated world with its balance restored" by the
contribution of all the cultures of the world.60
All this is to say that the Bergsonian injunction to crown intelligence with
intuition so as to restore the full capacity of the human mind finds its
social interpretation in Negritude's thesis of the civilization of the
universal. The higher civilization is the one that reinvents a new
humanism by integrating all the positive assets divergently developed
by each cultural trend. Where Bergson appealed for a more balanced
world in which mechanism works in tandem with mysticism, Senghor
read the imperative of collaboration between the West and Africa.
Jean-Paul Sartre was therefore right when he intimated that Negritude
"knows itself to be transitory."61 This transiency is inscribed in the
conception assigning divergent tasks to Western and African
civilizations. The conception vigorously calls for convergence as a way of
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completion: if an original unity has split into distinct parts, what else but
reunification is the right avenue? Grant that the split refers to the
emergence of races, and the contradiction, imputed to Negritude by
many critics, between the static, immutable nature of race and
historicity vanishes.6?_Instead, as Sartre said, "the race has transmuted
itself into historicity: the Present black explodes and temporalizes
himself; Negritude inserts itself into its Past and its Future in the
universal History; it is no more a state, neither even an existentialist
attitude; it is a Becoming. "63 Cesaire gave a forceful expression to this
state of becoming when he intimated that the heavy European baggage
that Negro intellectuals carry with them in their return to the source
metamorphoses them into "inventors of the soul. "64
The Originality of Negritude
This celebration of Africa's mission demands an inquiry into the measure
of autonomy that the thinkers of Negritude have secured vis-a-vis their
illustrious inspiration. All the more reason for raising the issue is that
the demonstration of the great influence of Bergson can be interpreted
as a support to those African scholars who maintain that Negritude is an
imported ideology that is entirely submissive to the West, especially to
its racist ideas. Indeed, some African scholars, dissatisfied with the idea
of mere influence, go so far as to indict Negritude for endorsing the
colonial viewpoint on Africa. The blame stretches beyond the charge of
imported and inauthentic intellectual expression; it sees a trend of
thought frankly detrimental to African interests and modernization.
When ethnophilosophy is exposed, to use V. Y. Mudimbe's expression,
as "an imaginary, intoxicating interpretation," Negritude is in the
frontline of this attack.65 Since the denial of the authenticity of
Negritude is corroborated each time a filiation is established with
Western discourses, the display of the profound reliance of Negritude on
Bergsonian concepts can only tilt the balance in favor of the denouncers
of Negritude.
Concerning this issue of authenticity, my contention is that the manifold
linkages to Bergson, while establishing the substantiality of his influence
on Negritude, should be seen against the background of numerous and
significant reinterpretations attesting the originality of Negritude. The
transposition of non technicalness and intuitive knowledge from the
realm of divergent human faculty to that of racial endowment is a case
in point. Also, Bergson was nowhere near to endorsing the polarized
picture describing traditional Africa as a civilization of peace and
harmony while the West is war-driven and hierarchical. Far from
implying the unequal distribution of bellicosity among races, Bergson
spoke of a "deep-rooted war-instinct underlying civilization," regardless
of its particularity.66 What is more, according to his views, the less a
culture is detached from the natural state, the more its social
organization is based on "self-centeredness, cohesion, hierarchy,
absolute authority of the chief," and so is highly prone to war ..6Z
These divergences are important enough to allow the characterization of
Negritude as an original, authentic African discourse. Take the issue of
non-technicalness. The affirmation of human diversity through the
assertion of non-technicalness clearly diverges from the premises of
Eurocentrism and evolutionism. In proudly claiming what the West
despises, Negritude conquers autonomy. Even if Western discourses had
here and there ennobled non-technicalness, they could not shake off
their strong romantic overtones, restricted as they were to expressing
their attachment to non-technicalness in terms of regret, of longing for a
lost disposition. Whereas for Negritude non-technicalness is an
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existential characteristic to which Africans owe their originality as well as
colonial onslaughts and acculturation, for European thinking it could only
represent a pre-rational stage left behind long ago following Europe's
engagement in the path of progress. This explains the ambivalence of
the West: committed to extirpating primitiveness through the civilizing
mission of colonialism, yet celebrating it in its artistic imagination, as
though the pause of rational thinking had opened up the valve of
primitive marvels. Stated differently, nostalgia for non-technicalness is
quite different from the claim to non-technicalness as one's originality.
With regard to authenticity, Senghor himself has an elegant argument.
According to him, the connection between Africa and the West, no doubt
palpable, should be looked at from the viewpoint, not only of Africans
being merely borrowers, but also from the viewpoint of Europeans
borrowing from Africa. This suggests that the attempt to analyze
Negritude as a product of the West should also consider whether the
movement against the dominance of reason is not itself a product of the
slow, insidious impregnation of the West with African values. Noting that
"art, like literature, is always the expression of a certain conception of
the world and of life, the expression of a certain philosophy and, above
all, of a certain ontology," Senghor concluded that it is impossible not to
agree with Emmanuel Berl when he said that "Negro revolution ...
helped to stir European plastic art at the beginning of [the twentieth]
century."68 This revolution brought about such schools of art as nabism,
expressionism, fauvism, and cubism, that is, the major moments of
Western contemporary art whose impact on Western philosophical ideas
was considerable.
The discovery of different civilizations had already inspired relativist
philosophies in the West. The artistic influence of Africa on the West
goes deeper by questioning the primacy of the rationalist view. Indeed,
European rationalism had favored the artistic vision known as realism.
Through imitation, but idealized by rationalism, the object is fixed and
reproduced, that is, objectified. Beauty is then the immobilized entity
offered for contemplation; it is not that which plunges into the sub-
reality, into the network of forces, but that which sticks out, doubtless
victorious, but cut off from the roots of life and facing only the surface of
reality. When Western contemporary art abandons the primacy of the
fixed object in favor of the interplay of shapes and colors, as Senghor
put it, "a world of life forces that have to be tamed is substituted for a
closed world of permanent and continuous substances that have to be
reproduced. "69 The point is that the substitution of interplay of forces
for the photography or objectification of the object bears witness to a
philosophical change questioning many of the assumptions of
rationalism. Instead of immobilizing the object, this attempt to let it be
seems to announce the rise of the desire to play within the desire to
conquer. The more firmly this philosophical revolution is associated with
the aesthetic impact of Africa on Europe, the less surprising becomes
the connections that scholars have observed between Negritude and
certain forms of Western thinking. Negritude is only claiming what
originally belongs to Africa.
Even if this argument is not entirely convincing, it cannot be altogether
excluded for three reasons. First, the influence of African art on
European artists is recognized by the artists themselves and by many
European scholars, who spoke of the "Negro revolution," of surrealists
being "modern primitives."ZQ Second, supposing that the influence is
not admitted, the pronounced propensity of the West to baptize
borrowings as its own invention should guard us against the exclusion of
African influence. The contact with and the study of non-Western
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peoples must have had an impact, however small, on the whole
philosophy of the West. Third, we cannot assume that the authors of
Negritude were so empty that they were only echoing Western thoughts.
In the process of their appropriation of Western thinking, some remains
of their cultural legacy must have crept into it. An insistence on the one-
sided process of acculturation should be moderated by the admittance of
an inverse process, even if its effect remained subdued.
This argument should be completed by a non-negligible factor pertaining
to the repeated excursions of Negritude into the realm of discrepant
concepts. For instance, regarding the theory of intuition, discrepancy
between Bergson and Senghor is not long coming. As far as Bergson
was concerned, intuition by itself does not provide knowledge; it must
be informed by discursive reason and purified by science. Intuition
means "instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable
of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely."71 This
becoming requires the active support of reason, not to mention the need
to clean the faculty of sympathy from magic and all sorts of bad habits.
As implied in the notion of divergent evolution, the purpose of intuition
is to complement intelligence; it is not to become an independent source
of knowledge.
Such is not the position of Senghor: emotion is explicitly categorized as
a sufficient form of knowledge and ranked above discursive reason.
Refusing the dichotomy between spirit and matter that Bergson
maintained, Senghor posited one reality, that of the vital force
accessible in its depths only to intuition. For Bergson, the dualism of
matter and spirit warrants the validity of reason with regard to material
phenomena, while prescribing the collaboration of intuition and reason
as a way of transcending dualism and reaching the absolute. Senghor
accepted absolute monism only; he had, so to speak, no job for reason:
being of the same stuff throughout, reality is wholly accountable to the
intuitive faculty so that what reason claims to know is but an apparent
reality. Bergson did not endorse this somewhat Kantian approach to
science for the simple reason that for him "positive science bears on
reality itself, provided it does not overstep the limits of its own domain,
which is inert matter. "72 In thus rejecting dualism and pushing
Bergson's idea of complementary faculties toward the autonomy and
self-sufficiency of one faculty, Senghor was but violating essential
components of Bergson's philosophy. Bergson regretted the neglect of
intuitive faculty, but he never suggested that it could provide a self-
sufficient knowledge.
Extreme caution is, therefore, required when, for instance, Sartre read
into the poems of Negritude "the famous distinction which Bergson
established between intelligence and intuition.''Z3 Not that the filiation is
wrong-we have established its deep ramifications-but because it does
not underline the numerous escapes proving that Senghor took from
Bergson what he wanted to take. Besides, Sartre himself revised his
position a little further by pointing out that the intuition of Negritude is
"far from the chaste and asexual intuition of Bergson."Z4 We conclude,
then, that Senghor's philosophical project remains distinct. Insofar as
Bergson was used for a philosophical goal that was not his own, his
influence amounted to the provision of intellectual tools. The violation of
Bergson's epistemology is a proof of this utilization: in not being
respectful to the end, Senghor evinced his freedom through the
subjugation of Bergsonian concepts to an alien philosophical stance.
Closely connected with this epistemological divergence between the two
thinkers is the issue of race. From Bergson's viewpoint, intuitive
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knowledge is not the appanage of a specific race any more than rational
knowledge is. His refutation of Levy-Bruhl's notion of pre-logical
mentality is a pertinent illustration of his rejection of the racist
interpretation. The part of sympathetic knowledge is certainly greater
among the primitives than among the civilized, but with the proviso
that, other than this difference due to usage, both faculties are inherent
in humankind. Not so for Senghor who specifically attributed the African
gift for sympathetic knowledge to the environment, to the "warm and
humid" nature of the tropical climate of Africa. 75 The resulting physical
and psychic mutations, among other things impressionability, are then
transmitted biologically. This Senghorian deviation illustrates to what
extent Bergsonian concepts are used to promote a discrepant
philosophical discourse. Senghor needed the concept of race both to
establish the African otherness and to ground its non-technicalness in a
biological particularity. To articulate his idea of Africa as the seat of a
different civilization, he interpreted racially the Bergsonian distinction
between intuition and intelligence while knowing perfectly that the
original distinction referred to two human faculties, less so to different
races.
The best way to determine the standing of Negritude is, then, to
uncover discrepant treatments against the background of substantial
borrowings. By highlighting the points of deviation, the method isolates
the independent purpose that initiated the borrowings. Besides, even
the opponents of Negritude recognize this independent purpose. When
Negritude is accused of being an irrelevant escapism, a conservative
ideology, a vindication of past vices, the properly African content of the
thinking is thereby admitted. For instance, the profession of non-
technicalness as well as of communalism cannot be ascribed to any
Western exhortation. The West has so stigmatized the absence of
technical prowess in Africa that the proud claim to non-technicalness
can only be the work of African scholars.
To my mind, the whole originality of Negritude lies in this inversion of
values. Sartre expressed it when he noted that "the Negro cannot deny
that he is Negro nor claim for himself [the] abstract uncolored
humanity. He is black. Thus he is held to authenticity. Insulted,
enslaved, he redresses himself; he accepts the word 'Negro' which is
hurled at him as an epithet, and revendicates himself, in pride, as black
in the face of the white. "76 This inversion of the racist discourse, this
"reevaluation of the values" of the West, to use Nietzsche's expression,
seems to me not only genuine but also philosophically significant.
Though Western thinkers too have variously and intermittently criticized,
in the name of spiritual values, the Western drive to conquest and
material wealth, precisely what they said appeared as individual
idiosyncrasies going against a general trend. They could not claim non-
technicalness as a virtue, as a cultural disposition, still less philosophize
and poeticize about it being the gift of a race.
Likewise, when Senghor transformed the idea of primitive Africa into the
seat of a different civilization characterized by such features as intuitive
knowledge, communalism, matriarchy, absence of classes,?? the
description of the features was certainly borrowed from anthropology,
not the idea of a different civilization. Cheikh Anta Diop developed this
idea into the theory of the two cradles of civilization. The development
represents the most radical attempt to channel the Western hierarchical
and evolutionary concepts into a pluralistic understanding of human
history. The merit of being the first to question the scheme of unilinear
history thus goes directly to Negritude.
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Lastly, the charge that Negritude is but an endorsement of the colonial
discourse simply obscures a phenomenon that is after all normal and
universal. "Throughout history," notes Claude Wauthier, "the demand
for national independence has gone hand in hand with cultural
revival. "28 This revival did more than claim the past; it rehabilitated it
by inverting the disparaging representation of the colonizer. Given that
the purpose of the colonial discourse was to weaken resistance and clear
the way for Westernization, its refutation required nothing less than the
transformation of the colonial scorn for indigenous characteristics into
positive distinguishing features. Critics overlook that the glory of power
and force in the Roman Empire was first defeated by the reverse
proposal to turn the other cheek.
Negritude is in keeping with the rule of repossession and redefinition of
identity. Although Western statements suggest important elements of its
vision, they do not determine Negritude's appropriation and its resulting
redefinition of identity. The colonial notion of Africa aimed at inculcating
the desire for acculturation; by turning the notion into the idea of
African otherness, Negritude aimed at inducing the will to resist
assimilatlon, even if, it is true, its success has been limited. All the
same, any inquiry into the causes of its nonsuccess cannot begin unless
there is prior agreement on the genuineness of its attempt.
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